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TENNESSEE v GARNER AND THE DEMOCRATIC
PRACTICE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
STEVEN L. WINTER*
INTRODUCTION

In Tennessee v. Garner,' the Supreme Court considered the constitution-

ality of the former Tennessee statute that codified the common law fleeing
felon doctrine. 2 Under that doctrine, the police were permitted to use deadly

force when necessary to prevent the escape of a fleeing suspect who the officer
reasonably believed had committed a felony. Although the doctrine did not
permit the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of suspected misdemean-

ants,3 it recognized no distinctions between suspected felons who were violent
and dangerous and those who were not. The historical roots of the doctrine

lay deep in the common law, going back to the tenth century and concepts of
forfeiture and summary punishment that were inherent in the traditional notion of felony.4
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Miami, B.A., Yeshiva College, 1974; J.D.,
Columbia University, 1977. As an assistant-counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc., the author represented Mr. Garner before the Supreme Court and the lower
federal courts.

The author would like to express his appreciation to Deval Patrick, Sanford Levinson and
Kenneth Casebeer, who graciously reviewed earlier drafts and provided helpful insights and
suggestions, and to Tony Amsterdam, without whose instruction none of this would have been
possible.
1. 105 S. Ct. 1694 (1985).
2. The former statute, which dated from the Tennessee Code of 1858, provided that: "If,
after notice of the intention to arrest the defendant, he either flee or forcibly resist, the officer
may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest." TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)
(formerly § 48-808). Two months after the decision in Garner,Tennessee amended the statute
to comply with the Court's ruling. The amended statute added the following qualifications:

(b) Notwithstanding [the above], deadly force is authorized to effect an arrest only if

all other reasonable means of apprehension have been exhausted, and, where feasible,
warning has been given the defendant, by identifying himself or herself as such officer,
or an oral order to halt, or an oral warning that deadly force might be used, and:
(1) The officer has probable cause to believe defendant has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm to the officer or
to any person in the presence of the officer;, or
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the defendant poses a threat of
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others unless he is immediately
apprehended.
(c) All law enforcement officers, both state and local, shall be bound by the foregoing provisions and shall receive instruction regarding implementation of same in law
enforcement training programs.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (Supp. 1985).
3. See, ag., Johnson v. State, 173 Tenn. 134, 114 S.W.2d 819 (1938).
4. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 98 (13th ed. 1800); F. POLLACK & F.
MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 465 (2d ed. 1909); Sherman, Execution Without
Triak Police Homicide and the Constitution, 33 VAND. L. REv. 71, 81 (1980).
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Garner involved the shooting death of a fifteen-year-old fleeing burglary
suspect who had entered a house when no one was home and stolen a coin
purse containing ten dollars. The officer shot Garner to prevent his escape
despite the fact that the officer had concluded that Garner was unarmed.3 The
Court held that the shooting violated the fourth amendment. It upheld the
constitutionality of the Tennessee statute only as applied to situations in which
"the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of
serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.... 6 Itarrived at this
standard by applying the balancing test developed in Terry v. Ohio7 and its
progeny,' "balancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it, [and]
examin[ing] the reasonableness of the manner in which a search or seizure is
conducted." 9 That analysis yielded the relatively obvious conclusion that:
"Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to
others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the
10
use of deadly force to do so.'
At the time of the Garnerdecision, almost half the states ostensibly still
followed the common law rule.' Eighteen states did so by statute, 12 four
5. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1697. The officer testified that he was "reasonably sure" that
Garner was unarmed. Indeed, on direct examination by the city's attorney, the officer was
asked: "Did you know positively whether or not he was armed?" He answered: "I assumed he
wasn't. .. ." Record at 639, Garner v. Memphis Police Department, Civil Action No. C-75145 (W.D. Tenn.) (1976).
6. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701.
7. 392 U.S. 1, 28 (1968). The Terry balancing test was presaged in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983); United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452
U.S. 692 (1981).
9. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1699.
10. Id. at 1701.
11. The use of the term ostensible is predicated on the fact that, in this area, it is not
always possible to ascertain reliably the actual "law" or practice of a given state. This may
manifest itself in one of three ways. First, a state may putatively follow the common law rule
but in actuality allow the use of deadly force even beyond the strictures of the common law.
This, for example, was the actual experience in Tennessee. In Memphis, there were 116 shootings by Memphis police during the years 1969 through 1974. Many of these cases involved the
shooting of escaping misdemeanants or of suspected felons who could have been apprehended
by means other than the use of deadly force. The common law did not authorize deadly force in
either situation. Nevertheless, throughout this period there were no prosecutions or internal
disciplinary actions against the police. And, with the exception of one case that settled, none of
the suits against Memphis or its police were successful until Garner.
Second, there were states whose courts followed the common law but whose police departments follow a more restrictive approach. For example, Michigan was a common law jurisdiction. Werner v. Hartfelder, 113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N.W.2d 825 (1982). But more than half
of the local law enforcement agencies, including all those of the largest jurisdictions within the
state, had deadly force policies more restrictive than the common law. See Staff Report of the
Michigan Civil Rights Commission at 54 (May 18, 1981).
Third, there were states in which the court decisions simply are unclear. For example,
Massachusetts had followed the common law. Uraneck v. Lima, 359 Mass. 749, 269 N.E.2d
670 (1971). But, in 1977, it applied the limitations of the Model Penal Code provision, see infra
note 16, to the actions of private citizens. Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 363 N.E.2d
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others by case law.13 In two states, the courts had narrowly construed existing

statutes to authorize deadly force to prevent escape only in cases involving
forcible felonies or where necessary to prevent injury.14 Of the remaining
states, two applied standards more restrictive than the common law rule as a
matter of case law. 5 The others had statutes that either adopted the limiting
principles of the Model Penal Code provision or otherwise specified the felo-

nies justifying the use of deadly force. Three states had no relevant statute or
case law and two had unclear positions, but seemed to be more restrictive than
6
the common law.'
1313 (1977). A later case suggested that the same standards might be applied to the police.
Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403 N.E.2d 931 (1980). Similarly, in Giant Food, Inc. v.
Scherry, 51 Md. App. 586, 444 A.2d 483 (1982), a Maryland case involving a private security
guard, an intermediate appellate court held that deadly force could be used only to prevent the
escape of a suspect who had committed a forcible felony and who continued to present an
imminent danger-a standard stricter than that adopted by the Court in Garner.
12. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-27 (1982); ARY- STAT. ANN. § 41-510 (1977); CA. PENAL CODE
§ 196 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-22 (1972); FLA. STAT. § 776.05 (1983); IDAHo
CODE § 19-610 (1979); IND. CODE § 35-41-3-3 (1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3215 (1981);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-15(d) (Supp. 1984); Mo. REV. STAT. § 563.046 (1979); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 200.140 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-6 (1984); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 732 (1981);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-9 (1981); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §s 22-16-32 -33 (1979); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982); WASH REV. CODE § 9A.16.040(3) (1977), see also OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.239 (1983) (use of deadly force limited to violent felons, but also allowed against
any felon if "necessary"); Wis. STAT. § 939.45(4) (1981-82) (officer may use force necessary for
"a reasonable accomplishment of a lawful arrest"). But see Clark v. Ziedonis, 368 F. Supp. 544
(D. Wis. 1973), aff'd on other grounds, 513 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1975) ("Before force which is
likely to cause death or great bodily harm can be used, one must reasonably believe that it is
necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm)."
13. These states are Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, and West Virginia. Werner v. Hartfelder,
113 Mich. App. 747, 318 N.W.2d 825 (1982); State v. Foster, 60 Ohio Misc. 46, 59-66, 396
N.E.2d 246, 255-58 (Com. Pl. 1979); Berry v. Hamman, 203 Va. 596, 125 S.E.2d 851 (1962);
Thompson v. Norfolk & W.R. Co., 116 W. Va. 705, 711-12, 182 S.E. 880, 883-84 (1935).
14. In California, deadly force may be used only if the crime for which the arrest is sought
was "a forcible and atrocious one which threatens death or serious bodily harm," or if there is a
substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm if apprehension is delayed. Kortum v. Alkire,
69 Cal. App. 3d 325, 333, 138 Cal. Rptr. 26, 30-31 (1977); see also People v. Ceballos, 12 Cal.
3d 470, 476-84, 116 Cal. Rptr. 233, 237-42, 526 P.2d 241, 245-50 (1974); Long Beach Police
Officers Ass'n v. Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 373-74, 132 Cal. Rptr. 348, 353-54 (1976).
In Indiana, deadly force may be used only to prevent injury, the imminent danger of injury or
force, or the threat of force-not simply to prevent escape. Rose v. State, 431 N.E.2d 521 (Ind.
App. 1982).
15. Though without statutes or case law on point, Louisiana and Vermont forbid the use of
deadly force except to prevent violent felonies. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:20(2) (West
1974); VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 13, § 2305 (1974 & Supp. 1984). In Sauls v. Hutto, a district court
interpreted the Louisiana statute to limit the use of deadly force against fleeing suspects to
situations where "life itself is endangered or great bodily harm is threatened." 304 F. Supp.
124, 132 (E.D. La. 1969). Sauls, however, was affirmed on other grounds.
16. Hawaii and Nebraska have adopted the Model Penal Code's provision verbatim. See
HAW. REv. STAT. § 703-307 (1976); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1412 (1979). With slight variations
in language, eighteen other states allow the use of deadly force if the suspect has committed a
felony involving the use or threat of physical or deadly force, or is escaping with a deadly
weapon, or is likely to endanger life or inflict serious physical injury if not arrested. See
ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.81.370(a) (1983); ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-410 (1978); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 18-1-707 (1978) DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 11, § 467 (1979) (felony involving physical
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Thus, the Garnerruling upset the legislative determinations of more than
a third of the states, a seemingly striking example of the countermajoritarian
practice of judicial review. Indeed, in Garner, the state and city defendants
argued that the advisability of a more restrictive standard governing the use of
deadly force was a policy question of the sort that properly belongs to the
legislative process.1 7 The Court's opinion did not respond to that argument
directly. Rather, it applied a familiar legal analysis. First, it considered the

doctrinal requirements of the fourth amendment balancing test.

8

It rejected

the state's historical argument premised on the coexistence of the common law
rule with the adoption of the fourth amendment. This historical approval of

the rule was irrelevant because of the substantial changes in the underlying
realities.

9

The Court then considered the "reasonableness" of the stricter

standard it imposed in light of the actual practices of American police depart-

ments.2" Finally, on the basis of uncontradicted empirical evidence, the Court
rejected the argument that burglary is an inherently dangerous crime that,

under the Court's own rule, justified the use of deadly force to prevent
escape.2 1

On the surface, then, the Court's opinion follows a classic doctrinal proforce and a substantial risk that the suspect will cause death or serious bodily injury or will
never be recaptured); GA. CODE § 16-3-21(a) (1984); ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 38, § 7-5 (1984);
IOWA CODE § 804.8 (1983) (suspect has used or threatened deadly force in commission of a
felony, or would use deadly force if not caught); KY. REV. STAT. § 503.090 (1984) (suspect
committed felony involving use or threat of physical force likely to cause death or serious injury, and is likely to endanger life unless apprehended without delay); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 17-A § 107 (1983) (person to be arrested poses a threat to human life); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.066 (1984); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:5(11) (Supp. 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C-3-7
(West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.30 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A401 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07.2.d (1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 508 (Purdon);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.51(c) (1974); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-404 (1978). Though it
once rejected distinctions between felonies, Uraneck v. Lima, 359 Mass. 749, 750, 269 N.E.2d
670, 671 (1971), Massachusetts has since adopted the Model Penal Code limitations with regard
to private citizens, Commonwealth v. Klein, 372 Mass. 823, 363 N.E.2d 1313 (1977), and seems
to have extended that decision to police officers. Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. 391, 403
N.E.2d 931 (1980). "A Maryland appellate court has indicated, however, that deadly force may
not be used against a felon who 'was in the process of fleeing and, at the time, presented no
immediate danger to... anyone....' Giant Food, Inc. v. Scherry, 51 Md. App. 586, 589, 596,
444 A.2d 483, 486, 489 (1982)." Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1704-05 n. 20. Montana, South Carolina,
and Wyoming are the states that either have no relevant statute or case-law.
17. Brief for Appellant in No. 83-1035, at 13-17; Reply Brief for Appellant in No. 83-1035,
at 3-6; Brief for Petitioners in No. 83-1070, at 11, 19-21; Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 831070, at 4.
18. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1700.
19. Id. at 1702-03. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
20. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1703-07.
21. Id. at 1706-07. The Court cited the then recent Justice Department report, BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, HOUSEHOLD BURGLARY (1985), which found that over a ten year
period, only 3.8% of all burglaries involved a violent crime. Id. at 4. The statistics presented
by Mr. Garner were strikingly similar. Two studies found a confrontation rate of less than 3%,
with an even lower rate of violence during those confrontations. T. REPPETrO, RESIDENTIAL
CRIME 17, 105 (1974); Conklin & Bittner, Burglary in a Suburb, 11 CRIMINOLOGY 208, 214
(1973). Only 1% of all burglaries became robberies, only .6% of all murders occurred during
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gression that measures the state statutory rule against a constitutional analysis
that considers text, precedent, history, and public policy. Yet a closer examination of the analyses that the Court invoked to support its judgment reveals a
process at work that is quite different-and certainly more complex-than the
conventional conception of judicial review as a countermajoritarian, undemocratic process.
To explicate this, it is helpful first to consider two distinct but related
phenomena apparent in the Court's opinion. The section that follows explores
the relationship between the Court's doctrine, its process of norm articulation,
and the importance of preexisting practice or custom. The discussion then
turns to a consideration of the sociology of the Court's norm articulating role.
Section III discusses the inutility of a purely historical approach. The concluding section considers some of the implications of these observations for the
current debate about the scope and legitimacy of judicial review.
I
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE DEMOCRATIC NORM

ARTICULATING MODE

In Garner,the Court devoted two subsections of its opinion to an analysis
of the statutory provisions and police department policies governing the use of
deadly force. While the second section focused on the practicability of the
Court's restrictive standard,' the first, somewhat longer section was of a very
different sort. It consisted of an open effort to divine a national trend or consensus concerning the common law rule and the appropriateness of the use of
deadly force against nondangerous suspects. The Court noted that "the long
term movement has been away from the rule" and that "[t]his trend is more
evident when viewed in light of the policies adopted by the police departments
themselves." 2 3
True, the Court never explicitly stated that its judgment depended upon
the majority practice. Typically, it put the issue in the negative: "[T]he older
and fading common-law view is a dubious indicium of the constitutionality of
the Tennessee statute ...."' Nevertheless, the Court seemed to rely heavily
on the fact that: "Overall, only 7.5% of departmental and municipal policies
permit the use of deadly force against any felon; 86.8% explicitly do not."'
Not incidentally, it cited to and relied on the amincus brief filed by several
police organizations and individual police departments in support of the respondent, Mr. Garner.2 6 This was the only amicus brief from the professional
burglaries, and only 6.5% of all rapes occurred in a residence between strangers. T. REPPE'Tro,
supra, at 5, 93.
22. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1705-07.
23. Id. at 1705-06.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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police community in the case.
The Court explained its search for "prevailing rules" as necessary "[i]n
evaluating the reasonableness of police procedures under the Fourth Amendment."'2 7 It relied on United States v. Watson as authority, but cited to the
part of Watson that considered the historical continuity of the common law
practice at issue in that case.28 Thus, Watson fails to explain the legal relevance of the Court's search for consensus in the national practice, since the
Court's opinion in Garner had already deconstructed the historical chain.
The cynic might perceive that, in seeking a consensus in existing law for
the rule it was imposing as a matter of constitutional imperative, the Court
was doing nothing more than acting prudently to cover its political flank. Perhaps so. Perhaps the Court's attempt to build on Watson was intended to
yield a rule of construction for the fourth amendment: that its prohibition of
"unreasonable" searches and seizures is to be defined in terms of current practice. But neither Watson or Garner suggest that there is an historical basis for
that rule.
The Court's prior cases, however, suggest a different, more defensible basis for that rule. Although the GarnerCourt did not rely on it for this point,
Payton v. New York 29 had previously canvassed and relied on current practice
as a basis for invalidating an arrest procedure. In Payton, the Court held that
the warrantless entry into a home to make an arrest violated the fourth
amendment. In reaching that conclusion, it engaged in an analysis which paralleled that in Garner. It observed that "[o]nly 24 of the 50 States currently
sanction" the practice and that "there is an obvious declining trend... ," and
argued that the trend and "the depth of the principle underlying" those state
determinations supported the Court's result.30 It explained this reasoning as
appropriate "when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word
'reasonable,' and when custom and contemporary norms necessarily play such
31
a large role in the constitutional analysis.,
The Court's analysis in both Payton and Garner is one that treats the
fourth amendment's concern with what is "reasonable" as an invitation to
decide questions of principles and values. Given that analysis, the Court's
concern with current practice is both defensible and suggestive of a process
that is quite sophisticated. For if the Court is engaged in the explication of
27. Id. at 1703.
28. Id. (citing United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976)). In Watson, the
Court held that it was not necessary to obtain a warrant to make an arrest in a public place.
The Court relied on the historical sanction of the practice in approving it as permissible under
the fourth amendment. Id.
29. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). Although Garnerdid cite Payton for the
proposition that the fourth amendment does not approve all police practices extant at the time
of its adoption, Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1702, it cited Watson and not Payton in its discussion of
the relevance of current practice. The reason for this may be that Justice White, the author of
the Garner decision, also wrote Watson but dissented in Payton.
30. Payton, 445 U.S. at 600; cf Watson, 423 U.S. at 423.

31. Id.
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values, it makes very good sense to refer to and be guided by the value judgments of other societal decision makers. A court should recognize that law
"consists of the generally accepted social norms [to be] applied in the decision
of the cases, norms that are--contrary to the positivists' position-best seen as
'part of the law,' quite independent of their promulgation through defined law
making procedures."3 2 Thus, contrary to the implications of cases like Marbury v. Madison3 3 and Cooper v. Aaron,' interpretation need not flow from
the top down, but may come from the bottom up as well.3" Indeed, this vertical dialogue is especially appropriate to a process of constitutional interpretation that implicates society's values.
One would not want it any other way in a democracy. Power and authority should flow up as well as down the hierarchy of political organization.
Those at the top of the political organization may have the power to declare
and require adherence to societal norms-that is, to "the law." But the process requires dialogue because the viability of those norms and the legitimacy
of their enforcement depends to a very large extent on the existence of a consensus-whether emerging or preexisting-amongst society.
Thus, those who have labeled themselves "noninterpretivists ' 3 6 or, now,
"supplementers," 37 are certainly correct in the descriptive sense and, more
than arguably, in the normative sense as well when they claim that the Constitution's "broad textual provisions are seen as sources of legitimacy for judicial
development and explication of basic shared values."3 8 But, I think, they are
incorrect in asserting that the legitimacy of that process is grounded solely in
an "interpretivist" methodology, whether strict constructionist or supplementing.39 Rather, cases like Garnerexemplify a process of dialogue in the "explication of basic shared values" that has become one of the major, though not
exclusive, modes of constitutional exposition. In a number of constitutional
32. Cf.Dworkin, The Model ofRules, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 14,28 (1967). Interestingly, the
Court's focus on public values was also revealed during the course of oral argument, albeit in a
question by one of the dissenters. Justice O'Connor's question---"Vhat do you suppose the
homeowners feel about whether someone who burglarizes a home is a danger to the commu-

nity?", Official Transcript of Proceedings before the Supreme Court of the United States, Dkt/
Case No. 83-1035 & 83-1070 at 42 (Oct. 30, 1984)-suggests a concern with public values and

mores that is not reflected in her dissenting opinion: "But it should go without saying that the
effectiveness or popularity of a particular police practice does not determine its constitutionality." Garner, 105 S.Ct. at 1709 (citing Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154, 3165 (1984),
discussed infra notes 67-72 accompanying text.).
33. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 138, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province and duty of the

judicial department to say what the law is.")
34. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1959) ("the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of
the Constitution ...").
35. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?,27 STAN.L. REV.703, 715 n.48 (1975)
(citing Dworkin, supra note 32; Wellington, Common Law Rules and ConstitutionalDouble
Standards. Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973)).
36. Grey, supra note 35.
37. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN.L. REv. 1 (1984).
38. Grey, supra note 35, at 709.

39. Cf id. at 706 (asserting that the primary task of adjudication is one of interpretation).
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areas, the Court has developed doctrines that explicitly focus attention on, and
implicitly draw authority from, the normative expressions of other societal
decision makers.

These doctrines first developed in the modem incorporation decisions.
Previously, the Court had asked whether a particular right or procedure was

"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"4 0 in determining whether rights
are fundamental and to be incorporated through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. This was a purely normative approach. Justice

Frankfurter sought to anchor this process in objective criteria and, therefore,
asked whether the right to be incorporated was within "those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking
peoples.... 41

As it evolved in the criminal procedure area, however, the incorporation
process began to pay more attention to the congruity of the right to be incor-

porated with the expressed preferences of the soon to be bound states. Thus,
in Mapp v. Ohio, the Court noted a trend toward adoption of the exclusionary
rule by the states.4 2 Similarly, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court took note
that almost half the states urged adoption of a right to appointed counsel in
criminal cases. 43 The modem decisions, however, have transformed the pro-

cess into an almost explicit exercise in nose counting. Now the "question is
not [whether it is] fundamental to fairness in every criminal system that might
be imagined but [whether it] is fundamental in the context of the criminal
processes maintained by the American States."' And, the Court explained,
the "better guide ... is disclosed by 'the existing laws and practices in the
Nation.' "Is

Thus, the nose counting methodology of Garner is not only explicable in
40. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (Cardozo, J.).
41, See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 67-68 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
During this period, the Court was inconsistent in its consideration of the relevance of state
practice to the incorporation decision. See Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process
Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L. J. 319, 327-28, 330-33 (1957). Compare
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 (1942) (majority opinion) (consensus of states is that appointment of counsel is a matter of legislative policy), with id. at 477 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting)
(majority of states provide counsel). See also Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). In Leland, the Court noted the importance of state judgments to the incorporation decision. Id. at
798. Nevertheless, it approved a unique Oregon statute that put the burden on a criminal defendant to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Only twenty other states put the
burden on the defendant; Oregon alone had fixed the burden of proof at beyond a reasonable
doubt.
42. 367 U.S. 643, 651-52 & n.7 (1961) (After the decision in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), "more than half of those [states] since passing upon it, by their own legislative or judicial decisions, have wholly or partly adopted or adhered to the Weeks [v. United States, 232
U.S. 383 (1914)] rule.").
43. 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963) (noting that twenty-two states filed as amiei curiae urging
that Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), be overruled).
44. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.14 (1968).
45. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970); accord Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161; Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 372 n.9 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
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theoretical terms, but also has antecedents in the doctrinal terms of incorporation. More important, the same methodology is evident in the Court's analysis
of the underlying constitutional provisions, irrespective of incorporation. It is,
for example, at the forefront of the Court's recent death penalty jurisprudence,
both in the cases where the Court has sustained the penalty and in those where
it has prohibited it.
At least since Weems v. United States," the eighth amendment has been
interpreted as "progressive," 47 -that is, it is "not fastened to the obsolete, but
may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humanejustice."48 This understanding of the eighth amendment was the nub of Chief
Justice Warren's formulation in Trop v. Dulles: "The Amendment must draw
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of
49
a maturing society.",
The opinions of the Burger Court, however, have abandoned the more
open-ended approach of judicial norm articulation characteristic of Weems
and Trop. Rather, the Court's explication of national values has become a
more disciplined inquiry into the normative pronouncements of other, more
"democratic" political organs. This change is signaled in part by the Court's
reformulation of Trop's "evolving standards of decency" test, which practically invited the Court to participate in that evolution. In its stead, the Court
has interposed the more modest "assessment of contemporary values,""O
which suggests a more conservative, passive role of observer and reporter.
This was most clearly illustrated in Justice Stewart's plurality opinion
upholding the constitutionality of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia,5 1 and
has since become the dominant mode of analysis in the Court's eighth amendment cases. While the Court continues to rely on history52 and, ultimately, its
own judgment "whether [the punishment] comports with the basic concept of
human dignity at the core of the Amendment... ,,' its focus has now shifted
to other more pluralistic sources of society's normative values.
At this juncture, it may be useful to examine the plurality opinion in
Gregg both for what it says about doctrine and for what kind of analytic process it employs. First, the Court invoked the rhetoric of judicial restraint:
[I]n assessing a punishment selected by a democratically elected legislature against the constitutional measure, we presume its validity.

46. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
47. Id. at 378.

48. Id.
49. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion).
50. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("determination of contemporary

standards").
51. See supra note 50.
52. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 176-79.
53. Id. at 182.
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This is true in part because the constitutional test is intertwined
with an assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative
judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. "[I]n a
democratic society legislatures, not courts, are constituted to respond to the will and consequently the moral values of the people." 54
This, of course, hardly explains the Court's opinion or process. The
Court necessarily acknowledged that "[t]his does not mean that judges have
no role to play, for the Eighth Amendment is a restraint upon the exercise of
legislative power."5 5 Any other approach would mean, in effect, that "[t]he
constitution•., is on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts,
is alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." 6 Indeed, it would
have meant that we had regressed beyond Marbury, for prior to Marbury it
was established that the federal courts were empowered by the supremacy
clause to hold unconstitutional the acts of state legislatures."
Rather, the Gregg opinion is best understood as an affirmation, as a national value, of "society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder""8
based on an assessment of the normative expressions of a variety of democratic
decision makers. First, the Court observed that "[tihe most marked indication
... is the legislative response to Furman [v. Georgia]."5 9 Second, the Court
noted the approval of the death penalty in California by a statewide referendum.' Third, the Court considered the judgments of actual juries since
Furman and concluded that they indicated agreement with the legislative
judgment in favor of capital punishment.6 1 Only then, having satisfied itself
that the country was in favor of the death penalty, did the Court bring its own
judgment to bear and sustain the constitutionality of the death penalty.
With one notable exception,62 the Court has continued to employ this
methodology in its later capital cases. Thus, in Coker v. Georgia,63 the Court
recognized that "[t]he current judgment with respect to the death penalty for
rape.., obviously weighs very heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment as a suitable penalty for raping an adult woman .
,
and in fact
54. Id. at 175 (citations omitted).
55. Id. at 174.
56. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
57. Prior to Marbury, the lower federal courts and the Supreme Court had invalidated
state statutes as conflicting with constitutional or treaty provisions. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S.
(3 Dali.) 199 (1796) (holding state statute in conflict with treaty obligation); D. CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS

25 (1982); 1 C. WARREN,

THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY

65-69 (Rev. ed. 1926).
58. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 179.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 181.
61. Id. at 181-83.
62. Spaziano v. Florida, 104 S. Ct. 3154 (1984).
63. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
64. Id. at 596.
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deferred to that judgment. In Enmund v. Florida,5 the Court noted and relied on "[s]ociety's rejection of the death penalty for accomplice liability in
felony murders...."'
Only in Spaziano v. Florida67 did the Court reject "the majority view that

capital sentencing, unlike other sentencing, should be performed by a jury.""
Rather, it argued that the Constitution "isnot violated every time a State

reaches a conclusion different from a majority of its sisters over how best to
administer its criminal laws."' 69 While Spaziano may not be the exception that
proves the rule-it may be accounted for on other grounds--it nevertheless
suggests the Court's reluctance to ignore the power of the nose counting methodology. Indeed, the Court conceded that the "argument obviously has some

appeal ....,171
And it was only after noting that it "twice has concluded that
Florida has struck a reasonable balance" that the Court concluded: "We are
not persuaded that placing the responsibility on a trial judge to impose the

sentence in a capital case is so fundamentally at odds with contemporary standards of fairness and decency that Florida must be required to alter its

scheme....

"72

Similarly, one can find other examples where the substance of a constitu-

tional guarantee is harnessed to a doctrinal standard that leads the Court to an
assessment of societal values. Garner pegged this inquiry to the "reasonable-

ness" requirement of the fourth amendment.73 But the Court has also developed another fourth amendment doctrine that allows it to assess
contemporary societal values and effectuate its reading of those values. Passing over Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz v. United States,74 which
was concerned with "the privacy upon which [one] justifiably rele[s] ... ,"75
65. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
66. Id. at 794.
67. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. 3154.
68. Id. at 3164.
69. Id. at 3165.
70. In an important sense, Spaziano presented the question of which democratic decision
maker to entrust with the life or death decision. Thus, in rejecting the argument that it must be
the jury, the Court noted that "[tihe community's voice is heard at least as clearly in the legislature when the death penalty is authorized and the particular circumstances in which death is
appropriate are defined." Id at 3164. That the question in Spaziano lent itself less readily to
the normative analysis described in the text is made clear by the fact that, whatever the Court
concluded was required in terms of process (that is, judge sentencing or jury sentencing), the
substantive decision of who should live or die would remain in the hands of a democratic organ.
Indeed, in Florida, the trial judges are elected, so that at every turn the Court was confronted
with a choice between two democratically representative agencies.
An analogous situation is presented in those cases where a representative legislature has
chosen to restrict participation in certain limited purpose elections, like school board elections.
CompareKramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1969), with id. at 639-40
(Stewart, J., dissenting), and with Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981) (per Stewart, J.).
71. Spaziano, 104 S. Ct. at 3163.
72. Id. at 3165.
73. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1699.
74. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
75. Id. at 353.
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the Burger Court has instead adopted the more normative formulation of Jus-

tice Harlan's concurring opinion: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "76 Here, too, the
word "reasonable" is the lacuna through which the Court slips into an assessment of contemporary norms.

The result of the Court's reformulation of Katz 77 is that it is now free to
reject fourth amendment claims when, in its view, society is not prepared to
recognize the particular privacy interest. And, since the typical claimant is a
criminal defendant, the Court's normative judgment that society would not
approve of the particular invocation of privacy at issue has so far predictably
proven correct. Thus, the Court has held that there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers one dials on one's telephone, upholding the
warrantless use of a pen register in Smith v. Maryland.78 Similarly, in Hudson
v. Palmer, the Court concluded that society is not prepared to recognize as

legitimate prisoners' expectation of privacy for the personal items they may
keep in their cells.7 9

This phenomenon of Supreme Court reliance on its assessment of the
contemporary norm is not limited to criminal procedure or even to constitutional law. This same process can be seen at work in a putatively statutory
case like Bob Jones University v. United States." When the Court held that
private educational institutions that discriminate are not entitled to tax ex-

empt status, it observed that "contemporary standards must be considered in
determining whether given activities provide a public benefit and are entitled
76. Id. at 361.
77. There can be no doubt but that this is a reformulation. As Professor Amsterdam has
observed:
Now let us consider the word "expectation" in the "reasonable expectation of privacy" formula to which Katz is speedily being reduced. "Expectation" is not a term
used in Mr. Justice Stewart's majority opinion in Katz; it has been lifted by subsequent
cases from Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion.... An actual, subjective expectation of privacy obviously has no place in a statement of what Katz held or in a
theory of what the fourth amendment protects ....If it could, the government could
diminish each person's subjective expectation of privacy merely by announcing halfhourly on television that 1984 was being advanced by a decade and that we were all
forthwith being placed under comprehensive electronic surveillance.... In short, the
common formula for Katz fails to capture Katz at any point because the Katz decision
was written to resist captivation in any formula.
Amsterdam, Perspectiveson the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384-85 (1974).
78. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
79. 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). In Oliver v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1735 (1984), the Court
affirmed the "open fields" doctrine of Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924), relying primarily on a textual analysis of the fourth amendment that argued that an open field is neither a
"house" nor an "effect." Oliver, 104 S. Ct. at 1740. Justice White would have gone no further.
Id. at 1744. The majority, however, also considered whether society was prepared to recognize
as legitimate an expectation of privacy in open fields. It concluded that society was not, despite
the apparent relevance of state laws of trespass. Id. at 1740-42.
80. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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to the charitable tax exemption."8 1 It found those contemporary standards in
two places. First, it observed that "there can no longer be any doubt that
racial discrimination in education violates deeply and widely accepted views of
elementary justice."82 Second, it noted that "myriad Acts of Congress and
Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to prohibit racial segregation
and discrimination in public education." 3
A similar process may be observed in some of the Court's treatments of
the doctrine of stare decisis. Since the Taney Court, it has been true that the
doctrine carries less weight in constitutional cases. 4 One explanation is suggested in cases in which the Court has not overruled precedent. This Term,
in Vasquez v. Hillery, the Court reaffirmed over a hundred years of precedent
holding that the exclusion of blacks from the grand jury is not to be treated
under the harmless error rule but rather should result in automatic reversal of
the resulting conviction.8 5 Justice Marshall cautioned that the Court's "decision is supported, though not compelled, by... stare decisis." 8 6 Eschewing
"any rigid formula to constrain the Court in the disposition of cases... ," he
indicated that precedent may be overruled when "changes in society or in the
law dictate that the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a greater
87
objective.",
Previously, Justice Stevens has expanded on his view of the kind of
"changes in society" that should be considered. In Runyon v. McCrary,8 8 Justice Stevens concurred in the Court's holding that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 proscribes
purely private conduct despite his disagreement with the decision in Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co.89 on which Runyon was based. Borrowing Justice Cardozo's explication of the limiting exceptions to stare decisis---"If judges have
woefully misinterpreted the mores of their day, or if the mores of their day are
no longer those of ours, they ought not to tie, in helpless submission, the
hands of their successors" 9 -- Justice Stevens reasoned that Jones should be
adhered to: "For even if Jones did not accurately reflect the sentiments of the
81. Id. at 593 n.20.
82. Id. at 592.
83. Id. at 593-95.
84. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 470 (1849).
85. 106 S. Ct. 617 (1986).
86. Id. at 624-25.
87. Id. at 625.
88. 427 U.S. 160, 189 (1976).
89. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
90. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191 (quoting B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 150-52 (1921)). Justice Cardozo was writing of the doctrine of stare decisis generally, not
that in constitutional cases specifically. Jones and Runyon were both statutory and constitutional cases, involving both the interpretation of section 1981 and the reach of the thirteenth
amendment.
Justice Cardozo also described the development of the common law in terms strikingly
similar to that presented in the text. According to Cardozo, the common law judge acts "as the
interpreter for the community in its sense of law and order... ;" his duty "to declare the law in
accordance with reason and justice is seen to be a phase of his duty to declare it in accordance
with custom.. . ." B. CARDOZO, supra, at 16, 106.
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Reconstruction Congress, it surely accords with the prevailing sense of justice
today.... [M]y understanding of the mores of today [is such] that I think the
Court is entirely correct in adhering to Jones."9 1
Similarly, a case like Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority 92 might best be explained by this thesis. In rejecting the state sovereignty
formulation of National League of Cities v. Usery,93 the Court abjured any
"license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty when measuring congressional authority under the Commerce Clause." 94 Rather, it
adopted the approach suggested by Professor Wechsler, 9" and derived from
Madison's The Federalist Nos. 46 and 62,96 relying on the political safeguards
of federalism inherent in the structure of the national government: "The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the States will not be
promulgated." 9 7 Another way to understand Garcia is to see the federalist
balance as an evolving one and to view the Court's position as deferring to the
democratic assessment of the proper balance at any given point.
II
THE COURT AS POPULAR ORACLE

If Garnerperhaps illustrates the Court's penchant for finding guidance in
democratic pronouncements before articulating societal norms in the course of
constitutional decisionmaking, it illustrates a related, though somewhat contradictory course, as well. For the other salient aspect of the Court's decision
in Garner is that it is an essentially moral pronouncement. In a single paragraph, which altogether contains only six sentences, the Court said all it really
needed to regarding both its reasoning and holding:
The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.
It is not better that all felony suspects die than that they escape.
Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no
threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him
98
does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.
The highlighted sentence is the simple moral syllogism that lies at the heart of
the decision. 99
91. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 191-92.

92. 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
93. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
94. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1017.
95. Id. at 1018 n.1 1; Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards of Federalism: The Role of the
States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543
(1954).
96. 105 S. Ct. at 1018 (citing The Federalist No. 46, at 332 and No. 62, at 408 (B. Wright
ed. 1961)).
97. 105 S. Ct. at 1020.
98. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1701 (citations omitted).
99. Elsewhere, I have characterized the Court's opinion as premised on "a moral equation
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The predominantly moral character of the Court's decision is emphasized
by the nature of the Court's disposition of the case. In remanding for further
proceedings in conformity with its opinion, the Court went out of its way both
to catalogue the various parties who would not be liable and to avoid ruling on
the liability of the city, the only remaining defendant."° On the latter point,

the Court noted that the city's liability hinged on Monell v. Department of
SocialServices loi-that is, whether the city had a policy that caused the con-

stitutional violation. Yet it was clear that the city had an explicit policy that
authorized the shooting at issue; the city had even quoted the policy in its

brief."02 Moreover, the lower courts had held that the officer had shot "as he
was taught." 103 There may be more than one conceivable explanation for the
Court's failure to follow the trajectory of its own logic. Nevertheless, the most
likely seems that-despite the classic justification of judicial review as necessary to the proper resolution of disputesl4---the Court's primary focus was

not on resolving the specific dispute before it, but rather on articulating the
relevant norm.
This suggests a second theme in the Court's practice of judicial review

that has long captured the attention and imaginations of commentators: the
relationship between the Court's interpretation of the Constitution and the

processes of religious interpretation. There is a growing and vital literature
that discusses-and, sometimes, argues quite vehemently over-the legitimacy
of a particular interpretivist stance,10 often invoking parallels to theological
stances and disputes. 10 6 On the other side, traditionalists of varying hues disof stunning simplicity." Winter, A Setback for Deadly Force (Op-Ed), N.Y. Times, Apr. 11,
1985, at A27, col. 3.
100. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1707.
101. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
102. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1070 at 3-4.
103. Garner v. Memphis Police Department, 600 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1979); Garner v.
Memphis Police Department, Civil Action No. C-75-145, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
slip op. at 6-7, 9-10 (W.D. Tenn. Sept. 29, 1976).
104. See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178; Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1959).
105. See, e.g., Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REv. 739, 74041 (1982)
(charging Professors Brest and Levinson with "nihilism"); see also Brest, The Fundamental
Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictionsof Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1063 (1981); Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 Tx. L. REv. 373 (1982); Levinson,
infra note 106).
106. See, e.g., Grey, supra note 35; Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE
L.J. 1290 (1957); Levinson, "The Constitution" in American CivilReligion, 1979 Sup. Cr. REv.
123; Mason, The Supreme Court" Temple and Forum, 48 YALE LJ. 524 (1959); see also Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights ofSuspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L REv.
785 (1970), reprinted in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE-WHAT THEY
SHOULD BE 401 (N. Dorsen ed. 1971). Professor Amsterdam compared the role of the
Supreme Court to that of the Pythia or priestess of the Oracle at Delphi:
This young maiden was periodically lashed to a tripod above a noisome abyss, where
her god dwelt and from which nauseating odors rose and assaulted her. There, the
god entered her body and soul, so that she thrashed madly and uttered inspired, incomprehensible cries. The cries were interpreted by the corps of professional priests
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pute the religious metaphor and argue that the interpretation of the Constitution as a legal document requires adherence to formal rules and legal

convention. 107
For the purposes of this discussion, the salient aspect of this commentary

is not the "correctness" or legitimating power of the religious metaphor, but
its curious persistence. Its roots lie deep in our constitutional history. As has
been pointed out, 0 s Thomas Paine suggested that we frame a charter and

crown it king;10 9 John Marshall invoked the metaphor in describing
"America, where written constitutions have been viewed with so much reverence," 1 10 and described the alternative as legislative "omnipotence."'
De
Tocqueville described the process of judicial review not as voiding unconstitu-

tional legislation, but rather as censuring it and diminishing its moral force.112
And, despite his well known opposition to Dred Scott,' 13 President Lincoln
early in his career
described "reverence for the laws" as the "political religion
14
of the nation."'

Even the interpretivists who argue that constitutional adjudication must
recognize the specifically legal nature of the document, and thus the legal conventions in interpretation, acknowledge the special power of t1he religious metaphor. "Perhaps these religious metaphors capture something special about
expounding 'a constitution' that goes beyond the complexity'of the constituof the Oracle, and their interpretations were, of course, for mere mortals the words of
the god.
On its tripod atop the system of American criminal justice, the Supreme Court of
the United States performs in remarkably Pythian fashion. Occasional ill-smelling
cases are wafted up to it by the fortuities of litigation, evoking its inspired and spasmodic reaction.... The significance of the Court's pronouncements-their power to
shake the assembled faithful with awful tremors of exaltation and loathing-does not
depend upon their correspondence with reality. Once uttered, these pronouncements
will be interpreted by arrays of lower appellate courts, trial judges, magistrates, commissioners and police officials. Their interpretation of the Pythia, for all practical
purposes, will become the word of god.
To some extent this Pythian metaphor describes the Supreme Court's functioning in all the fields of law with which the Court deals....
By what I have said so far, I do not mean to suggest that Supreme Court decisions ... are unimportant. Like the Pythia's cries, they have vast mystical significance. They state our aspirations. They give a few good priests something to work
with. They give some of the faithful the courage to carry on and reason to improve
the priesthood instead of tearing down the temple.
Amsterdam, supra, at 785-86, 793 (emphasis in original).
107. Fiss, supra note 105, at 750-55; Grey, supra note 106, at 13-17.
108. Grey, supra note 35, at 17-18.

109. T.

PAINE, COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLITICAL WRITINGS

32 (N. Adkins ed.

1952).
110. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 178.
111. Id.

112. 1 A. DE

TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

102 (1835).

113. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
114. Quoted in Levinson, supra note 106, at 124.
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tional context and the high stakes at issue in constitutional controversy."' 5
Indeed, they do. The aptness and persistence of the religious metaphor
stems, in my view, from the functional similarity of religion to the process of
constitutional adjudication. Here I have in mind not the parallel of unifying
symbolism described so well by others," 6 although that too is important.
Rather, it is the functional similarity in terms of the processes discussed so far
that illustrates the continuing vitality of the metaphor.
Nothing distinguishes religion from other forms of social organization so
much as the explicit emphasis on moral values and their role in structuring

human behavior. What makes the Constitution like scripture and its interpretation akin to hermeneutics is the role that values inevitably play. This is so

regardless of the mode of interpretation adopted; even the "strict constructionist" seeking the "original intent" cannot avoid an excursion into values,
albeit those of the Framers, in an effort to ascertain the meaning of valueladen terms like unreasonable searches and seizures,17 due process of law,11 8
cruel and unusual punishment, 11 9 or equal protection of the laws.1 20 In writing a constitution, the Framers were engaged in nothing so much as an effort

to protect certain values; the Constitution was formed "in Order to... establish Justice ...and secure the Blessings of Liberty ....
Those who wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights had been through a
revolution and knew that times change. They were embarked on a
perilous course toward an uncertain future and had no comfortable
assurance what lay ahead. To suppose they meant to preserve to

their posterity by guarantees of liberty written with the broadest latitude nothing more than hedges against the recurrence of particular
forms of evils suffered at the hands of a monarchy beyond the seas
115. Grey, supra note 106, at 17.
116. Id. at 21-22; Levinson, supra note 106, at 123-25, 150.
117. See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) ("The principles ...reach
farther than the concrete form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all invasions, on the part of the Government and its employees, of the
sanctities of a man's home and the privacies of life.")
118. Learned Hand characterized constitutional provisions like the due process clause as
cast "in such sweeping terms that their history does not elucidate their contents." L HAND,
THE BILL OF RIGHTs 30 (1958); see also Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 603 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) ("But whether a confession of a lad of fifteen is 'voluntary' and as such admissible, or 'coerced' and thus wanting in due process, is not a matter of mathematical determination. Essentially it invites psychological judgment-a psychological judgment that reflects
deep, even if inarticulate, feelings of our society."); accord Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 449
(1985) ('This Court has long held that certain interrogation techniques... are so offensive to a
civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause.....).
119. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("a principle to be vital must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth").
120. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954) ("In approaching this
problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted ....I%
Bickel, The Original Understandingand the SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L REv. 1, 63-65
(1955).
121. U.S. CONST. preamble.
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22

It is also worth remembering that the Framers believed in Natural Law1 2 3 and
"inalienable rights," 1 24 concepts that speak of values and higher morality.
A system calling for the explication of values typically spawns an agency
or class cultivated for the purpose. It is therefore entirely predictable that
traditional defenses of judicial review have tended to focus on the institutional
advantages of courts and the dispositional superiority of judges as explicators
of national values. John Stuart Mill noted:
[T]he peculiarity inherent in a Court... that its declarations are not
made at a very early stage of a controversy, that much popular discussion usually precedes them; that the Court decides after hearing
the point fully argued on both sides by lawyers of reputation....
Even these grounds of confidence would not have sufficed to produce
the respectful submission with which all authorities have yielded to
the decisions of the Supreme Court on the interpretation of the Constitution were it not that complete reliance has been felt, not only on
the intellectual preeminence of the judges composing that exalted
tribunal, but on their entire superiority over either private or sectional partialities.

125

Similarly, Professor Bickel extolled the special capacity of courts
for dealing with matters of principle that legislatures and executives
do not possess. Judges have, or should have, the leisure, the training, and the insulation to follow the ways of the scholar in pursuing
the ends of government. This is crucial in sorting out the enduring
values of a society....
Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of time give courts
the capacity to appeal to men's better natures, to call forth their aspirations, which may have been forgotten in the moment's hue and
26

cry. 1

These observations, like the religious metaphor, continue to echo in the cur27
rent literature concerning judicial review.'
These perceptions of the judiciary are not confined to the commentators,
but pervade popular practice and attitudes as well. We surround our courts
with ritual and mystique and accord our judges, like a secular priesthood, with
distinctive honor. Our judges are clad in robes and sit on high benches. We
122. Amsterdam, supra note 106, at 399.
123. Grey, supra note 35, at 715-16.

124. The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
125. J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 242-43 (1861).
126. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 25-26 (1962).
127. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS

138, 162 (1980); Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Forward: The Forms of Justice, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1, 13 (1979).
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rise when they enter the court. They are addressed as "Your Honor," and one
must seek their permission before one may approach. They are called upon to
officiate at the holiest of occasions like a marriage or the swearing in of a new
president.
Perhaps it is these public attitudes that account for the particularly
American practice of judicial review and the reliance on the courts to resolve

authoritatively even the most political questions."z Confidence in the courts
runs deep; even though public opinion sometimes runs high against the substantive decisions of the Court, Supreme Court Justices continue to rank high
in polls of public confidence." 9
Indeed, the perception of the Court as expositor of values has so perme-

ated our culture that it sometimes confounds the lawyers who practice before
the Court. Recently, the Attorneys General of forty-three states and three
territories filed a brief as amici curiae in Evans v. Jeff D. ,1 a case concerning

negotiation of attorneys' fees in civil rights actions that raises issues of both
legal ethics and statutory interpretation. 13 1 Their brief suggested that if the
128. 1 A. DE TOCQUEviLLE, supra note 112, at 280 ("Scarcely any political question
arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.").
129. J.CHOPER, supra note 128, at 138.
130. 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986).
131. Evans v. JeffD. was a class action brought on behalf of adolescents in mental institutions in Idaho. The plaintiffs claimed that they were receiving inadequate treatment and that
some of them were housed in dangerous conditions, such as on wards with adult sex offenders
and child molesters. The defendants had conditioned their offer of settlement upon a waiver of
the statutory attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). The settlement offer would have
provided the plaintiff class with substantial, if not complete relief. Counsel were thus put in a
conflict of interest with their clients; their ethical duty to exercise independent judgment on
behalf of the client class, MODEL CODE OF PRoFESsIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5, required
them to accept the settlement offer and forgo the fee. In order to preserve their position, they
negotiated a provision in the settlement that conditioned the fee waiver on the approval of the
district court. Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. St. 1531.
In the courts, plaintiffs' counsel argued that the fee waiver was coerced by the exploitation
of their ethical duty to their clients and that, therefore, the waiver violated both the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the statutory policy of section 1988 that fees be awarded in
these cases. The district court ruled against the plaintiffs and the court of appeals reversed. Jeff
D. v. Evans, 743 F.2d 648 (9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court reviewed the Ninth Circuit and
reinstated judgment of the district court.
Some federal courts have upheld such waivers. See, eg., Moore v. National Assoc. of Sec.
Dealers, 762 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lazar v. Pierce, 757 F.2d 435 (Ist Cir. 1985). The
Third and the Ninth Circuits had barred simultaneous negotiations of fees and the merits to
avoid such conflicts. Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3rd Cir. 1977); Jeff D.,
supra, see also Lisa F. v. Snider, 561 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ind. 1983); Regalado v. Johnson, 79
F.R.D. 447 (E.D. 111.1978). Three bar associations have considered the matter under the Code
of Professional Resonsibility and each concluded that the waiver offer is coercive and unethical.
Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the New York City Bar Association, Op. No.
80-94, reprintedin 36 REc. A.B. Cn-Y N.Y. 507 (1981); District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics
Committee, Op. No. 147, reprinted in 113 DAILY VASH. LAw REP. 389 (1985); Grievance
Commission of the Board of Overseers of the Bar of Maine, Op. No. 17 (1981). See generally
Kraus, Ethical and Legal Concerns in Compelling the Waiver ofAttorney's Fees by Civil Rights
Litigants in Exchangefor Favorable Settlement of Cases under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Awards Act of 1976, 29 VILL. L. REv. 597 (1984); Comment, Settlement Offers Conditioned
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Court were to hold that a particular negotiation tactic does not violate the
intent of the statute, that ruling would preempt state interpretations of their
codes of legal ethics by operation of the supremacy clause. 1 32 Basic principles
of federalism indicate the error of that position; state ethical codes may proscribe what federal statutes condone. The argument makes sense only if one
conceives of the Court's condonation of the practice under the statute as morally legitimating; in that case, the value judgment of the supreme expositors
could be understood to preempt the moral judgments of lesser agencies.
It should be stressed, therefore, that these conceptions of judicial priesthood point in a direction very different than do the doctrines described above.
They point instead to a judiciary that articulates values free from the constraining influence of public opinion and mores. They suggest a hierarchical
process that commands respect for the Platonic formulation of societal values.
The dichotomy between "oracular" and "democratic" value exposition
does not divide neatly along a liberal-conservative axis. If a Court views itself
as an oracle in determining societal values, it may declare conservative as well
as liberal ones. An example is the interchange between the Burger Court and
some of the more liberal state supreme courts in the criminal procedure area.
Professor Tribe has highlighted the interchange in Oregon v. Haas.133 The
Oregon court declined to follow Harris v. New York 3 4 and instead held that
statements elicited from a defendant after he had invoked his right to remain
silent 3 5 could not be introduced as impeachment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that "a State may not impose.., greater restrictions ... as a
matter offederal constitutionallaw when this Court specifically refrains from
imposing them."13 6 Tribe's criticism suggests that because the rule of the Oregon court was not itself unconstitutional, it should not have been disturbed. 137
On that basis, he argues that reversal cannot be explained by the Court's invocation of the supremacy clause, but only by the Cooper v. Aaron notion of the
Supreme Court as supreme expositor of the Constitution. 138
In fact, the hubris of exposition extends beyond that in Haas. For that
opinion at least recognized the authority of the state courts to impose more
rigorous standards of criminal procedure as a matter of state law. 139 Since
Haas, however, the Court has extended its reach. In Michigan v. Long, 140 the
Court adopted a new rule for determining when a state court decision that
upon Waiver of Attorneys' Fees: Policy, Legal and Ethical Considerations, 131 U. PA. L. REv.
793 (1983).
132. Brief for Alabama, et al. as Amici Curiae at 41-42 n.20, Evans v. Jeff D., No. 84-1288.
133. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
134. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
135. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73 (1966).
136. Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. at 719 (emphasis in original).
137. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 31 (1978).
138. Id. at 31-32 ("It was thus the Oregon court's heresy, and not its action, that led to
reversal....").
139. Haas, 420 U.S. at 719.
140. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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relies upon both state and federal law is shielded from review by the independent and adequate state ground rule: When it is not clear from the opinion
itself that the state court relied upon an adequate and independent state
ground, the Court will assume that the state court "rested its decision primarily on federal law."14' 1
In dissent, Justice Stevens echoed Professor Tribe's argument that there
was no federal interest in restraining Michigan from overprotecting its citizens
and imposing more restrictive rules on its police.' 42 The majority's response
spoke only to the interest in maintaining uniformity in the application of federal law by the state courts.14 This, of course, is not fully responsive, since it
does not explain why a disuniformity that overvalues the federal interest is of
concern to the Court. The answer may well be that a Court which sees itself,
like Justice Cardozo's common law judge, "as the interpreter for the community in its sense of law and order... ,"144 is very much concerned when some
other agency disagrees with the balance of values that it has struck. Indeed, in
one case, the Chief Justice invited the voters in the states to overrule their
supreme courts by referenda or state constitutional amendments whenever
require more than the Supreme Court in areas of criminal
those courts
1 45
procedure.
III
GARNER AND THE INuTirrrY OF ISTORY
Before returning to the questions raised by interpolation of values
through the medium of judicial review, it may be helpful to make a short
detour to touch upon the relevance of history. Because Garnerconcerned an
historic practice known at the time of the Framers, it would seem to present
an excellent opportunity to engage in a "jurisprudence of original intent," saving the courts from the "undemocratic" exercise of exposition and imposition
of values. Appearances, however, deceive.
The Court rejected the historical approach: "Because of sweeping change
in the legal and technological context, reliance on the common-law rule in
this case would be a mistaken literalism that ignores the purposes of a histori141. Id. at 1042.
142. Id. at 1067-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1042 n.8 (majority opinion).
144. B. CARwozo, supra note 90, at 16. The same phenomenon can be seen in Young v.
United States, 315 U.S. 257 (1942). In Young, the Court declined to accept unexamined the
Solicitor General's confession of error in a federal criminal case. It accepted, even extolled, the

Solicitor's duty to confess error in the interest ofjustice. "But such a confession does not relieve
this Court of the performance of the judicial function.... [O]ur judicial obligations compel us
to examine independently the errors confessed.... The public interest that a result be reached
which promotes a well-ordered society is foremost in every criminal proceeding. That interest
is entrusted to our consideration and protection.. .." Id. at 258-59 (citations omitted); see also
A. CAMuS, THE FALL 18, 41 (1956).
145. Florida v. Casal, 462 U.S. 637, 639 (1983) (Burger, C.J., concurring in the dismissal

of the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted).
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cal inquiry."' 14 6 Without pausing to explain the proper purposes of an historical inquiry, the Court explained that the common law rule known to the
Framers authorized the shooting of a suspect liable for the death penalty, since
virtually all felonies were, at that time, capital offenses. This meant that the
common law doctrine authorized only a consequence no greater than what
would have ensued upon capture. Moreover, it authorized only the killing of
those reasonably presumed to be dangerous-since for the most part common
law felonies concerned crimes of violence and, in any event,1 47a suspected capital felon could be expected to use force to escape his fate.
Similarly, the common law rule developed when weapons were rudimentary. As a practical matter, deadly force could be inflicted in a hand-to-hand
situation; 1 48 in that event, the fleeing felon doctrine was consistent with the
officer's privilege of self defense in the lawful exercise of his duty. This historical reality was reflected in the 1858 Tennessee statute at issue in Garner,which
was entitled "Resistance to Officer" and authorized the use of force necessary
"to effect [an] arrest" when suspects "flee or forcibly resist....
Thus, history revealed very little about what the Framers would have
thought about shooting a nondangerous fleeing suspect who had taken ten
dollars and who, if captured, would have been subject only to treatment as a
juvenile. 15 0 If either proportionality or self defense justified the common law
rule, then history counseled rejection of the modem version of the fleeing felon
doctrine. At the least, history was uninstructive; at worst, its application
would have led to a quite arbitrary rule that allowed the killing of nonviolent
felony suspects, but prohibited the shooting of more dangerous misdemean1 51
ants like drunken drivers.
In this connection, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit is again
instructive. Rejecting the historical state immunity doctrine, the Court noted
the inutility of history in terms equally applicable to Garner: "The most obvious defect of a historical approach ..
is that it prevents a court from accomodating changes. ...
At the same time, the only apparent virtue of a
rigorous historical standard, namely, its promise of a reasonably objective
measure... is illusory." ' 52
146. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1702.
147. Id. at 1702-03.
148. Id. at 1703.
149. TENN. CODE ANN.

§ 40-7-108 (1982).
150. Edward Eugene Garner was only fifteen when he was killed. Under Tennessee law
applicable at the time, a child under sixteen was typically treated as a juvenile and could only
have been adjudicated a delinquent. TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-102 (1977), repealed by Acts 1982
(Adj.S.), ch. 934, § 14. Although there was a provision for the transfer of juvenile suspects to
the adult courts, ordinarily transfer was limited to those who were at least sixteen. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 37-234 (1977), amended, Acts 1982, (Adj.S.) ch. 637, § 5. Fifteen-year-olds
could only be transferred to an adult court if charged with one of the violent offenses enumerated in the statute; burglary was not one of those offenses. Id.
151. Garner, 105 S. Ct. at 1703 n.12.
152. Garcia, 105 S. Ct. at 1014.
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IV
VALUES AND JuDIcIAL REVIEW

I do not propose to extrapolate from these observations a theoretical defense of judicial review or judicial norm articulation. Such an exercise is beyond the scope of this article. My primary inquiry has thus far been
phenomenological; I have attempted to describe what the Court does in fact,
not to justify it in theory. Nevertheless, some tentative conclusions are in
order.
First, it is evident that the Burger Court is most typically engaged in a
very conservative variety ofjudicial review. Thus, while Garnermay look like
a Warren Court decision, it is in reality made of very different stuff. Like its
predecessor, the Burger Court continues to engage society in a dialogue about
basic values. But its role is more deferential, more reactive, more reflective
than imaginative.' 5 3 The difference between the Warren and Burger Courts
could be described this way:
Under a particularly activist view, the judiciary spearheads social development by perceiving the need for social change well before
that need is recognized by most members of society and by subjecting the masses to norms espoused by advanced social thinkers at the
earliest moment that popular acceptance becomes possible. Under a
less activist view, the judiciary is more of a follower than a leader,
functioning to ensure that recalcitrant elements in society keep pace
with social developments that have already been guided down the
path of majority acceptance by other social institutions,
In either form, what is most salient is the importance of the dialogue
between the Court and society over the content of our norms and deepest
values. Dialogue is instrumental in maintaining the quality of the process of
norm articulation and the resulting norms. It also increases the legitimacy of
that process. A Court unconstrained by societal judgments in the explication
of values would be insufferably undemocratic. Conversely, a society that left
the articulation and development of its values solely to the partisan political
process and the expedience of governance would risk moral enfeeblement. By
raising the process from the unconscious and unspoken to the articulated and
dialogical, we achieve a significant advance over the dangers of the ad hoe and
the questionable legitimacy of value imposition.
To be sure, there is the question of the forms this dialogue will take and
the parameters that will govern it-that is, the proper balance between these
mutually constraining factors of judicial value exposition, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, the democratic determination of policy through the
153. While this Court may be more deferential in its assessments, it is, nevertheless, no less
confident of the rectitude of its vision of society and its values than was its predecessor. Thus, it

is no less insistent about compliance with those conclusions. See, eg., Haas, 420 U.S. 714.
154. Spann, Expository Justice, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 585, 600 n.59 (1983).
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political process. This, of course, has always been the core problem of judicial
review. The introduction of a more explicit normative dialogue, however, operates powerfully and positively to engage these opposing elements in an em-

brace-

both mutually nourishing and constraining. If the shape of that

relationship has yet to be developed, the model shift is nevertheless an ad-

vance. The task of elaboration will require the identification not just of the
proper occasions for judicial exposition,1 5 but also the continued development

of the legitimate sources and contents of the values that will and should fuel
the engine of the process.1 56 It will require a new vocabulary-that is, new

forms of analytic and doctrinal justification such as are emerging in cases like
Payton and Bob Jones. All this is the work of the future.
In the meantime, however, attacks from the right that focus either on the
Court's interposition of values or on the alleged superiority of an historical
approach cannot succeed on the theoretical grounds of greater democratic

sensitivity. To the contrary, much of what the Court has been practicing has
been exceedingly democratic. An historical approach, on the other hand, is
less democratic. To the extent that even an historical approach necessarily

entails judgment in exegesis, it threatens to impose values covertly in the guise
of interpretation. To the extent that some "true" intent of the Framers is
divined,"5 7 it imposes on the present the perhaps outdated and perhaps destructive value judgments of the past.1 58 In either event, an historical approach fails to arrive at a democratic consensus. The Court's more open
ended approach is democratically superior and, therefore, more legitimate.
155. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); J. Ely
Democracy and Distrust (1980); Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 713
(1985).
156. See generally R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1984).
157. Cf. Amsterdam, supra note 77, at 398:
[The... use of background history encounters the objection that it treats the framers
as a collection of bodies having but one head; it assumes that from their common
"living experience" they drew but one conclusion. As soon as the question becomes
one of generalizing beyond a particular evil, this hypostatic conception of "the framers" becomes still more dubious; for generalization requires reference to the reasons
for a prescription, and a variety of minds may agree upon a common prescription for a
variety of reasons. When, in addition, the generalization is negative, the usefulness of
seeking to construct the common thought of that variety of minds called "the framers" asymptotically approaches zero.
(footnotes omitted).
158. See, e.g., Wechsler, supra note 104, at 19.
I argue that we should prefer to see.., the Bill of Rights read as an affirmation of the
special values they embody rather than as statements of a finite rule of law, its limits
fixed by the consensus of century long past, with problems very different from our
own. To read them in the former way is to leave room for adaptation and adjustment
if and when competing values, also having constitutional dimension, enter on the
scene.
Accord Amsterdam, supra note 77, at 399 ("Nor do I see a reason to conclude that the framers
intended .. the Bill of Rights or the Constitution... to state a principle like the dwarf in
Gunter Grass' Tin Drum, who suddenly and perversely decided to stop growing because growth
was what grownups expected of him. Growth is what statesmen expect of a Constitution.").
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In considering this more explicitly expository approach, it is important to
note that it is not different in kind from what judges have historically done: It
is precisely the critical function identified by Cardozo as the role of the common law judge. It does not inevitably threaten the judicial autocracy of substantive due process; whether activist or deferential, a value articulating
approach is necessarily constrained to some degree by public opinion. This
says no more than history teaches."5 9 As Professor Tribe argues:
Most of the worry about how far judges may go, however genuine it
may be and however fashionable it is again becoming, strikes me as
rote unreality, profoundly misconceived in light of the inevitable social and cultural constraints on judicial intention and impact. Those
constraints are perennially strong; they explain why the Supreme
Court's decisions, even those universally rejected in a later era, may
be controversial when they are rendered but never seem unthinkable
at that time.' 60
Many are the examples of the proposition that "as constitutional statesmen,
the justices must arrive at some ultimate accomodation with dominant
opinion."161
Finally, Garnermay be the most salutary form of judicial review. For in
the articulation of worthy norms that are recognized as such and accepted by
society, the Court serves both democracy and its own institutional legitimacy.
[I]ts resonance [is] strengthened by the degree to which the Court
does appear to retain the faculty both of educating a majority that
has temporarily foresaken constitutional values and of calling for adherence to profound ideals. Since certain of the Court's rejection of
popular will are perceived by the people and their representatives as
legitimate and worthy acts of authority by the nonpolitical branch of
government, some exercises of judicial review do earn public respect
for the judiciary. Indeed, given the function that the Justices historically have assumed in our system, it may well be that if they were
totally to abandon their role as educators and supervisors of the national conscience they would be regarded with disdain as much or
more than if they were to seek to impose their personal views and so
159. At least by the thirteenth century, political philosophers recognized that even autocrats ruled to some degree only with the consent of the governed. See B. TuCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR: THE CALAMrrous FOURTEENTH CENTURY 325 (1978). There are many

examples of the Court's modification of doctrine in the face of strongly adverse public opinion.
See infra notes 162-63.
160. L. TRiBE, supra note 138, at iv (emphasis in original).
161. Westin, Also on the Bench: "DominantOpinion," in THE SuPREM COURT UNDER
EARL. WauN 63, 71 (L. Levy ed. 1972); see also NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301
U.S. 1 (1937); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); J. CHOPER, supra note
128, at 161. In this sense, the Warren Court was not so different from its successor. Compare
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959), with Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957); see also Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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62

To the extent that Garner is an example of the articulation of a norm worthy
of respect, and I believe that it is, it is an appropriate and legitimate exercise of
the Court's power.
162. J. CHOPER, supra note 128, at 162 (noting attractiveness of theory quoted in the text,
but questioning its completeness).
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